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Over the past decade and a half, the tax shelter industry and other
phenomena have forced tax practitioners to focus more closely than ever on
the standards that govern advising and preparing tax return positions.I
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1. See, e.g., Steven C. Salch, Tax Practice Ethics: Practitioner Discipline and
Sanctions (Part 2), ALI-ABA CoURSE MATERIALS J., Feb. 1992, at 79; see also Michael
C. Durst, The Ta Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 FLA. L. REv 1027 (1987);
Kenneth L. Hams, Resolving Questionable Positions on a Client's Federal Tax Return: An
Analysis of the Revised Section 6694(a) Standard, 47 TAx NOTES 971, 972 (1990); Robert
H. Mundheun, Remarks of the General Counsel of the Treasury Department Before the
Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 18, 1980), in How TO PREPARE & DEFEND TAX
SHELTER OPINIONS 71 (Law and Business, Inc. ed., 1981); James R. Rowen, When May a
Lawyer Advise a Client That He May Take a Position on hits Ta Return?, 29 TAX LAW. 237
(1976).
This Article will not consider the problems raised by transfer pricing regulations under
§ 482 of the I.R.C. and the related penalties under § 6662(e). Transfer pricing refers to the
price one division of a company charges another for products transferred between the
divisions. RALPH L. BENKE, JR. & JAMES D. EDWARDS, TRANSFER PRICING: TECHNIQUES
AND USES 1 (1980). Transfer pricing presents problems when one division of a company
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Professional organizations, Congress, and the Treasury have all tried their
hands at formulating standards for advising and preparing tax return
positions. These efforts have resulted in sorhe progress in formulating
workable standards governing tax return advice and preparation. A
concomitant result, however, has been a proliferation of slightly differing
standards governing taxpayers and preparers (including advisors), as well
as puzzlement among practitioners as to the precise meaning and application
of the various standards. Bewildered practitioners have gained little if any
enlightenment from two recent developments: (1) the recently finalized
amendments to Circular 230,2 and (2) the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993's (1993 Act) elevated standard for insulating a tax return
position against the accuracy-related penalty by special disclosure on the
return.3 The amendments to Circular 230 adopt a "realistic possibility of
success" (RPOS) standard for tax return preparation and advice and attempt
to quantify the standard as a one-in-three chance of being sustained on the
merits.4 The 1993 Act raises the standard for the minmum position on a
tax return that can be insulated against the taxpayer penalties for substantial
understatement and disregard of rules and regulations by changing the
is in country A and another division is in country B. By manipulating the price of the
product, the company can lower its overall tax burden by allocating its income to the
country with the more favorable tax laws. Under § 482 of the I.R.C., the IRS can allocate
income between two businesses that are owned or controlled by the same entity I.R.C.
§ 482 (1988). The fair market price of a product, however, may be difficult to determine.
Further, the substantial misstatement valuation of this income is penalized under § 6662(e).
I.R.C. § 6662(e) (Supp. V 1993). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
amended § 6662(e) to require taxpayers to prepare, maintain, and provide documentation
to substantiate intercompany transfers to avoid penalties for substantial or gross valuation
of transactions. In response, the IRS, on February 2, 1994, dropped the proposed
regulations published on January 21, 1993, and adopted Treasury Decision 8519. 59 Fed.
Reg. 4791 (1994). These regulations provide a two-part exception from the imposition of
the accuracy-related penalty with respect to transfer pricing adjustments, depending upon
whether the taxpayer used a specified or unspecified method under § 482. 59 Fed. Reg.
4791 (1994). The Treasury issued final regulations governing transfer pricing under I.R.C.
§ 482 on July 8, 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 34,971 (1994). It also issued temporary and proposed
regulations on the accuracy-related penalty to conform the previously issued proposed and
temporary regulations with the new final § 482 regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 35,030 (1994).
2. T.D. 8545, Final Regulations Governing Practice of Individuals Before IRS, 59
Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. subtit. A § 10 [hereinafter Circular
230)) (issued June 20, 1994) [hereinafter Amendments to Circular 230].
3. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13251, 107
Stat. 312, 531 [hereinafter OBRA of 1993].
4. See Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(a); mnfra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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standard for adequate disclosure of the position from "not frivolous" to
"reasonable basis."I By contrast, the income tax preparer penalty retains
a "not frivolous" disclosure standard,6 thereby creating one disclosure
standard for the taxpayer penalty and another for the preparer penalty
The American Bar Association (ABA) and American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) have moved to conform their
requirements to the RPOS standard7 over the past several years, while the
preparer penalty and Circular 230 have moved in a generally similar
direction. Nevertheless, the various RPOS standards vary slightly from one
another, and alternate standards, such as substantial authority and
reasonable basis, may also apply in many circumstances. 8 Moreover, many
practitioners believe that significant imperfections remain in the existing
standards, not the least of which is the difficulty of applying them in
practice.' For example, in fall of 1993, the authors surveyed members of
5. OBRA of 1993, § 13251.
6. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
7 See American Bar Association Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
(1986), Formal Op. 85-352 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 85-352], reprinted in
BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE I, 14 Tax Transactions Libr.
(CCH) 2003, at 3566 (1992) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE II]. The ABA
states:
A lawyer may advise reporting a position on a tax return so long as the
lawyer believes in good faith hat the position is warranted in existing law or can
be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law and there is some realistic possibility of success if the matter is
litigated.
Id. The AICPA provides:
A CPA should not recommend to a client that a position be taken with
respect to the tax treatment of any item on a return unless the CPA has a good
faith belief that the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained
administratively or judicially on its merits if challenged.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax
Practice, (1988 Rev.) No. 1, reprinted in STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE I, supra, 2006,
at 3659.
8. See Appendix A for a table listing the myriad tax return standards that may apply
to a given tax return position.
9. See, e.g., Letter from David R. Brennan, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, to the Internal Revenue Service (Nov 19, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File, 92 TNT 244-34 [hereinafter references to the TNT File will be cited by
TNT citation only]; John A. Corry, Chairman of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar
Association, NYSBA Takes Issue With Proposed Rules on Contingency Fees, Jan. 11, 1993,
available in LEXIS, 93 TNT 19-30; Letter from Harvey L. Coustan, Chairman, Tax
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the Tax Section of the Virginia Bar Association concerning their attitudes
and opinions on the current state of the rules governing tax return
standards. In response to one question, eighty-two percent of the
respondents disagreed with the proposition that the rules are "consistent,
clearly defined, and reasonably easy to apply "' This Article reviews the
amendments to Circular 230 and the new reasonable basis disclosure rule
and reports the above survey of tax practitioners.
I. Circular 230
Circular 230 is the governing document that provides rules and
standards for eligibility to practice before the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)." Practice before the IRS "comprehends all matters connected with
a presentation" to the IRS on behalf of a client and includes "preparing
necessary documents, corresponding and communicating with the Internal
Revenue Service, and representing a client at conferences, hearings, and
meetings." 2 The IRS Director of Practice can disbar a practitioner from
practice before the IRS for violation of Circular 230's rules and standards. 3
Moreover, other practitioners are prohibited from practicing in association
with a disbarred practitioner. 4 Hence, violation of Circular 230's rules and
standards can result in the loss of a tax practitioner's livelihood.
Originally, Circular 230 held tax practitioners only to a vague standard
of "due diligence" with respect to their dealings with the IRS." Then, in
Executive Committee of the AICPA, to The Honorable Shirley D. Peterson, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (Nov 18, 1992), available in LEXIS, 92 TNT 236-13; Michael C.
Durst, Circular 230 Amendments Incorporate Different Return Standards For Preparers and
Taxpayers, Attorney Says, Nov. 18, 1992, available m LEXIS, 92 TNT 231-25; Letter from
Gary L. Green, Jr. et al., National Society of Public Accountants, to the Internal Revenue
Service (Nov. 18, 1992), available in LEXIS, 92 TNT 235-67; Letter from Patricia Lewis
et al., Tax Section of the District of Columbia Bar Association, to The Honorable Shirley
D. Peterson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Dec. 22, 1992), available in LEXIS, 92
TNT 259-21; Letter from Lawrence F Portnoy, Price Waterhouse, New York, New York,
to the Internal Revenue Service (Nov 11, 1992), available in LEXIS, 92 TNT 235-66;
William L. Raby, Raby Finds Gaps in New Preparer Responsibility Regs., Oct. 15, 1992,
available m LEXIS, 92 TNT 208-178; Letter from Steven C. Salch to the Internal Revenue
Service (Nov 12, 1992), available in LEXIS, 92 TNT 235-68.
10. See Practitioner Survey, App. B, Responses to Question 11.
11. See Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.0.
12. Id. § 10.2(e).
13. Id. § 10.50.
14. Id. §§ 10.24, 10.51(h).
15. James P Holden, Practitioners' Standard of Practice and the Taxpayer's Reporting
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1986, in response to concerns with overly aggressive positions being taken
on tax returns, the Treasury proposed to tighten the standard with respect
to tax return positions. The 1986 proposal would have prohibited
practitioners from advising tax return positions that would subject the
taxpayer to the substantial understatement penalty under former I.R.C.
§ 6661.16 This proposal met vehement opposition from tax practitioners,
including the ABA and AICPA, who joined together in suggesting that the
RPOS standard be substituted for the substantial authority standard. 7
Practitioners based their objections on: (1) the nature of the old substantial
understatement penalty as essentially a no-fault penalty; and (2) the limited
nature of authorities on which a taxpayer could rely under the old law In
the face of this opposition, Treasury did nothing further with the proposal
for several years. Then, in October 1992, Treasury proposed the amend-
ments to Circular 230 that it recently adopted.'"
As amended, Circular 230 basically.adopts the I.R.C. § 6694 RPOS
standard,'9 which in turn is a more stringent version of the RPOS standard
set out in ABA Opimon 85-352. In order for a practitioner to advise a
position on a tax return, the practitioner must first deternmne "that there is
a realistic possibility of the position being sustained on its merits."'
Circular 230 defines a realistic possibility of success as being present "if a
reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax
law would lead such a person to conclude that the position has approximate-
ly a one in three or greater likelihood of being sustained on its merits."2
Position, 20 CAP. U. L. REv 327, 335 (1991) (citing Circular 230, § 10.22).
16. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113 (1986) (proposed to be codified at 31 C.F.R. subtit. A § 10)
(proposed Aug. 14, 1986). For a summary of these proposals, see IRS Regulations, 32 TAX
Noms 639 (1986). The substantial understatement penalty under old I.R.C. § 6661 has
been recodified at I.R.C. § 6662(d).
17 See, e.g., Holden, supra note 15, at 337; Letter from John B. Jones, Jr., Chair,
ABA Section of Taxation, to Leslie S. Shapiro, Director of Practice, Internal Revenue
Service (Feb. 12, 1987), reprinted in Paul J. Sax, Ethics in Tax Practice: Current Issues,
38 TuL. TAX INST. ch. 18, at 57 (1988); Letter from Leonard Podolin, Chairman, AICPA
Responsibilities in Tax Practice Subcommittee, to Leslie S. Shapiro, Director of Practice,
Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 13, 1987), reprinted in Sax, supra, at 79, 82.
18. See Proposed Amendments to Circular 230, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (1992);
Amendments to Circular 230, supra note 2.
19. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (1993).
20. Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(a)(1)(i).
21. Id. § 10.34(a)(4)(i). The possibility that a position will not be challenged because
of the audit lottery odds cannot be considered in making this determination. Id.
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In addition, Circular 230 restricts the authorities on which a practitioner
may rely in determining if there is a realistic possibility of success to those
available for determmng if there is substantial authority under the
substantial understatement penalty rules.'
If the practitioner cannot determine that the position satisfies the
relevant tax return standards, he?' must advise the client of possible
penalties likely to apply and of the opportunity to avoid any penalty by
making adequate disclosure of the position.24 A practitioner may not sign
a return containing a position that fails to meet the RPOS standard unless
the position is "not frivolous" and the taxpayer makes adequate disclosure
to the IRS.' Circular 230 provides some lemency for inadvertent
deviations from the standard by providing that "only violations [of the
RPOS and disclosure standards] that are willful, reckless, or a result of
gross incompetence will subject a practitioner to suspension or disbarment
from practice before the Service. "I Hence, advising an undisclosed
position that fails to meet the RPOS standard and thereby incurs the § 6694
preparer penalty, will not necessarily result in Circular 230 sanctions, even
though the Circular 230 RPOS standard is virtually (but not precisely)
identical to the § 6694 RPOS standard.'
22. Id.
23. This Article uses the pronouns he, him, and his in the traditional generic sense to
indicate both the masculine and feminine gender when the antecedent's gender is
indeterminate. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
24. Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(a)(2).
25. Id. § 10.34(a)(1). A return position is frivolous if it is "patently improper." Id.
§ 10.34(a)(4)(ii).
26. Id. § 10.34(b), § 10.52.
27 Both Circular 230 and the regulations under § 6694 define RPOS as "approximate-
ly a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained on its merits." Id.
§ 10.34(a)(4)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (1991). Both also restrict the authorities that
may be considered to those set out in § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) of the substantial understatement
penalty regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991). However, the § 6694
regulations state that:
The analysis prescribed by § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) for purposes of determining
whether substantial authority is present applies for purposes of determining
whether the realistic possibility standard is satisfied.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (1991). By contrast, Circular 230 does not contain this
sentence, but states only that the "authorities listed in § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii), or any successor
provision, of the substantial understatement penalty regulations may be taken into account
for purposes of the [RPOS] analysis." Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(a)(4)(i). Hence,
Circular 230, unlike the preparer penalty regulations, is silent on the extent to which it
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A. Restriction on Authorities
In formulating the Circular 230 RPOS standard, the Treasury moved
toward conforming its own standard to those of the ABA and AICPA.
Nevertheless, significant differences remain among those standards. The
most vital difference is Circular 230's limitation of authorities on which the
practitioner may rely to those listed under the substantial understatement
penalty regulations. Circular 230, unlike the ABA and AICPA standards,
limits the authorities on which the practitioner may rely for purposes of
determining whether a return position meets the RPOS standard to the
"authorities described in section 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) of the substantial
understatement penalty regulations."29
Unlike the regulations under the preparer penalty, Circular 230 does
not expressly incorporate the mode of "analysis prescribed" by the
substantial understatement regulations.30 The significance of this difference
is not clear. What is clear is that the authorities upon which a practitioner
incorporates the analysis prescribed by the substantial understatement penalty regulations.
28. See 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (1992).
29. Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(a)(4)(i). A practitioner may use the following
types of authority in determining if there is substantial authority-
1. Applicable provisions of the IRC and other statutory provisions;
2. Proposed, temporary, and final regulations construing such statutes;
3. Revenue rulings and revenue procedures;
4. Tax treaties and regulations thereunder, and Treasury Department and other
official explanations of such treaties;
5. Court cases;
6. Congressional intent as reflected in committee reports, joint explanatory
statements of managers included in conference committee reports, and floor
statements made prior to enactment by one of a bill's managers;
7 General Explanations of tax legislation prepared by the Joint Committee on
Taxation (the Blue Book);
8. Private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda issued after October 31,
1976;
9. Actions on Decisions and General Counsel Memoranda issued after March 12,
1981,
10. [GCMs] published in pre-1955 volumes of the Cumulative Bulletin;
11. IRS information or press releases; and
12. Notices, announcements, and other administrative pronouncements published
by the Service in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991). By contrast, the ABA and AICPA standards do
not so limit the authorities upon which a practitioner can rely See infra notes 45-46.
30. See supra note 27
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may depend for purposes of Circular 230 RPOS are the same as the
authorities upon which one may rely to determine if there is substantial
authority for a tax return position. Consequently, although the Treasury
claimed to be moving toward the ABA and AICPA tax return standards m
its Circular 230 amendments,3 in actual practice, the Circular 230 RPOS
standard may be closer to the substantial authority standard than to either
the ABA or AICPA RPOS standards.
The permssible authorities upon which one may rely under either
Circular 230 or the substantial understatement penalty standards are the
same. Both standards are below "more likely than not" (fifty percent
chance of success) and the Circular 230 RPOS standard must be around
thirty-three percent or more.2  If the same authorities restrict both
standards, if both standards are below "more likely than not" (fifty percent
chance of success), and if Circular 230 RPOS must be approximately thirty-
three percent or more, it is very hard to discern any significant distinction
between the two. Thus, a tax return position supported by permissible
authorities sufficient to satisfy the Circular 230 RPOS standard will almost
always satisfy the substantial authority standard as well. It will be a rare
case indeed when a position satisfies Circular 230 RPOS, but does not have
sufficient support to meet the substantial authority standard. It will be an
even rarer mortal mind that can recogmze that subtle difference if it does
arise. In practice, the two standards are very likely to meld together.
This would not necessarily be an undesirable result, provided
appropriate modifications were made to the list of permissible authorities.
A uniform standard for tax return positions is preferable to the profusion
of standards that exist currently In the practitioner survey, approximately
sixty percent of the respondents favored a single uniform standard and
about seventy-two percent found acceptable a standard similar to the ABA
RPOS standard.33 However, the limitation of authorities under both the
Circular 230 and substantial understatement penalty needs to be changed.
Currently, conclusions reached in legal treatises and periodicals are not
permissible authority for purposes of Circular 230, the substantial
understatement penalty, or the preparer penalty This places a substantial
restriction on practitioners who, of necessity, often have to rely on these
31. See Amendments to Circular 230, supra note 2.
32. See Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(4)(i) (realistic possibility of success
defimed as "approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained" on
merits).
33. See Practitioner Survey, App. B, responses to questions 7, 8.
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sources when other authority is not available, or when there are not
sufficient time and resources to research a matter in great depth.
The reality is that practitioners regularly use these sources. Taxpayers
and the IRS cite them in audit and at the appellate office level. Everyday
tax return preparers and even more sophisticated advisors are forced to rely
on them.' Given the amount and complexity of new legislation over the
past several years, there often is simply no authority interpreting a given
Code provision. 5 The practitioner has no choice but to depend on his own
analysis of the provision and that of learned colleagues published in the
professional literature. 6
Obviously, some secondary authorities are less than completely
reliable. For example, it would be poor practice for a practitioner to rely
on an everyday tax return manual to support a complex tax return
position.37 Moreover, some secondary sources may be self-serving
or overly taxpayer-favorable m their analyses.38  Nevertheless, there
are also extremely reliable sources upon which practitioners rely, such as
Bittker and Eustice39 in the corporate tax area and McKee, Nelson and
34. See Sheldon I. Banoff & Harvey L. Coustan, Final Regulations on Return
Preparer's Penalties: 1RS Refuses to Deal, Preparers' Fears Prove to Be Real/Penalty
Roulette-Roll the Wheel/Who Knows How the Courts Will Feel, 70 TAXES 137, 160, 162
(1992); Calvin Johnson, "True and Correct:" Standards for Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAX
NOTES 1521, 1526 (1989). Calvin Johnson states:
In determining whether a legal position is likely to prevail, a model taxpayer
sometimes has to rely on good tax theory, wise commentators, and public
speeches by Treasury or congressional officials, even if such "quasi-law"
sources do not technically qualify as "authority "
Id.
35. See Letter from John B. Jones, Jr. to Leslie S. Shapiro, reprinted in Sax, supra
note 17, at 72 (transmitting individual comments of members of Section of Taxation
concerning proposed Amendments to Circular 230).
36. See Banoff& Coustan, supra note 34, at 160.
37 See Stengel v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 903 (1992) (taxpayer negligent
in relying on J.K. Lasser guidebook and IRS publication 547 to support novel tax return
position).
38. Conversely, an analysis may be overly favorable to the government position. This
seems especially true of articles written by professors as contrasted to those written by
practitioners. See, e.g., Gwen T. Handelman, Law and Order Comes to "Dodge City"
Treasury's New Return Preparer and IRS Practice Standards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv 631
(1993); Johnson, supra note 34.
39 BoRis I. BrrrmE & JAMEs S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (6th ed. 1994).
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WhitnmreM in the partnership tax area. Moreover, courts also frequently
consult and cite such authorities.4 '
The unreliability of some secondary sources should not preclude
reliance on all secondary sources. It is possible to include the reliability
and expertise of the secondary authority as part of any RPOS analysis of
secondary authority Practitioners should not be demed reliance on these
well-recogmzed, expert authorities when, m fact, most practitioners
appropriately recognize the value of these sources and conduct their
practices accordingly 42
An argument against permitting taxpayers and practitioners to rely on
secondary sources is that such reliance would obviate the role of duly
constituted political authorities to make law The argument is that the law
is only what the authorities promulgated by government officials say it is.
Hence, to sanction use of secondary sources as permissible authority would
allow taxpayers and their advisors to usurp the role of lawmaker properly
confined to the duly constituted political officials authorized to promulgate
primary authorities.43
40. WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
(2d ed. 1990).
41. E.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 148 n.2 (1960); Claridge Apartments
Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 146 n.9 (1944); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,
373 n.4 (1943). Professor Bittker states:
Once a court decides to look beyond the four corners of the [Internal Revenue
Code], there are no formal restrictions on the material that may be taken into
account in interpreting the statutory language. Thus, courts m federal tax
cases look not only to such formal sources of legislative history as committee
reports and legislative debates but also to less formal sources such as hearings,
memoranda by trade groups, and commentators.
1 BORIS I. BITIXER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND
GIFTS 4.2.2, at 4-23 (2d ed. 1989).
42. Reluctance to recognize secondary authority presumably results from the primacy
of judicial interpretation in the Anglo-American legal tradition. By contrast, in the civilian
tradition in which the statute has primacy, judicial precedent and the writings of a legal
scholar have parity with respect to persuasiveness. C. Garrison Lepow, Deconstructing Los
Angeles or a Secret Fax from Magntte Regarding Postliterate Legal Reasoning: A Critique
of Legal Education, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF 69, 95 n.100 (1992). See generally JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 56, 60 (2d ed. 1985).
43. See Amendments to Circular 230, supra note 2, pmbl. (rejecting suggestions that
secondary authority be made permissible on ground that standard should be "grounded" in
laws made); Letter from Gwen T. Handelman, Associate Professor of Law, Washington and
Lee University, to the Internal Revenue Service (Nov 13, 1992), available in LEXIS, 92
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While this is a perfectly respectable jurisprudential position on the
nature of law and lawmaling, it is not the only nor the most realistic one.
Lawmaking is a process that properly involves those governed as well as
those governing. The IRC is not self-executing. Taxpayers and practitio-
ners must apply the Code to a given case, and by this act of specification,
they either expand or restrict and, hence, "change" the Code.'
Taxpayers and their advisors faced with making decisions in conduct-
mg their affairs must take actions dependent on a given interpretation of the
law Often, there is little primary authority on an issue. Taxpayers and
their advisors, using the available resources, including secondary authority,
must plot a course of action based on their own best interpretation of the
law These decisions may then face the scrutiny of adrmnistrators or
judges. If the taxpayer's interpretation of'the law is correct, it may acquire
the status of primary authority in a case or ruling, and the taxpayer and
advisor will in a real sense have "made law " The standards of both the
ABA 45 and the AICPA4 reflect this by sanctioning resort to secondary
authority
TNT 235-69.
44. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 150-51 (1989); Lepow, supra
note 42, at 95.
45. The ABA RPOS standard, by basing the norm on possible success in litigation,
sanctions resort to whatever authority a court might consider. Courts often consider
secondary authority See supra text accompanying note 41.
46. The AICPA provides:
For example, the CPA may reach a conclusion on the basis of well-reasoned
articles, treatises, IRS General Counsel Memoranda, a General Explanation of
a Revenue Act prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and
Internal Revenue Service written determinations (for example, private letter
rulings), whether or not such sources are treated as "authority" under section
6661.
AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice, (Rev 1988) No. 1, reprinted in
STANDARDS OF TAX PRACnCE 11, supra note 7, 2006, at 3659. AICPA interpretation No.
1-1 states:
In determining whether a tax return position meets the CPA's realistic possibility
standard, a CPA may rely on authorities in addition to those evaluated in
determining whether substantial authority exists. Accordingly, CPAs may rely
on well-reasoned treatises, articles in recognized professional publications, and
other reference tools and sources of tax analysis commonly used by tax advisors
and return preparers.
Id. at 3661, quoted in Banoff& Coustan, supra note 34, at 160 n.167
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As a matter of fact, in some circumstances a practitioner's failure to
consult secondary sources may constitute negligence. Consequently, the
lawmaking process involves more than the Austiman view of law merely as
commands from political superiors to political inferiors.47 Taxpayers and
practitioners play a proper role in this process by interpreting the law as
best they can in conducting their affairs.
Finally, the substantial understatement penalty regulations provide that
practitioners may rely on the "authorities underlying" the conclusions in the
secondary sources, as contrasted to the conclusions themselves.
Moreover, in the absence of primary authority, the practitioner may rely on
a "well-reasoned" construction of the statute as authority But a "well-
reasoned" construction of the statute is precisely what many secondary
sources purport to attempt. If an article does cite authority that underlies
the article's conclusions, it will inevitably contain a reasoned analysis of
that authority, which in turn should qualify as a well-reasoned analysis of
the statute the cited authority interprets. Thus, the distinction between
conclusions m a secondary source and the authorities underlying those
conclusions collapses upon itself.
Taxpayers and practitioners must as a practical matter rely on
secondary authority on an everyday basis. Judges do likewise. The
47 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, reprinted in PHILIP
SHUCHMAN, COHEN AND COHEN's READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
8 (1979). Austin states:
Laws proper, or properly so called, are commands; laws which are not
commands, are laws improper or improperly so called. Laws properly so called,
with laws improperly so called, may be aptly divided into the four following
kinds.
1. The divine laws, or the laws of God: that is to say, the laws which are
set by God to his human creatures.
2. Positive laws: that is to say, laws which are simply and strictly so called,
and which form the appropriate matter of general and particular jurisprudence.
3. Positive morality, rules of positive morality, or positive moral rules.
4. Laws metaphorical or figurative, merely metaphorical or figurative.
The divine laws and positive laws are laws properly so called. Of positive
moral rules, some are laws properly so called, but others are laws improper.
Id. at 8. "The matter of jurisprudence is positive law: law, simply and strictly so called:
or law set by political superiors to political inferiors." Id. at 13.
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991); T.D. 8382, 1992-1 C.B. 394. It is
likely, but not entirely certain, that this interpretation applies in the case of Circular 230 as
well as under the substantial understatement penalty The reason for this uncertainty is a
slight difference in the wording of the Circular 230 regulations. See supra note 27 and text
accompanying notes 29-30.
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standards of both the ABA and the AICPA recognize this. It is a fiction to
pretend that secondary sources do not exist for purposes of the Circular 230
RPOS standard. In the practitioner survey, 65 % of the respondents favored
allowing reliance on secondary authority, while a mere 17.5% opposed
such reliance and 17.5 % were undecided.49 Hence, a substantial majority
of the responding practitioners favored permitting reliance on secondary
authority The law should recognize the common practice of the profes-
sion. The Circular 230 RPOS standard (as well as the preparer penalty
RPOS standard to which Circular 230 conforms) should permit reliance on
secondary authority, with the analysis taking into account the persuasiveness
(or lack thereof) of such authority
B. One-in-Three Quantification of RPOS Standard
Circular 230, as well as the preparer penalty regulations, attempts to
quantify the RPOS standard by stating that a tax return position satisfies the
RPOS standard if "a reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person
knowledgeable m the tax law would lead such a person to conclude that the
position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being
sustained on its merits. "I Thus, the standard requires the practitioner to
become an oddsmaker at best, a divine at worst. There is considerable
doubt among practitioners about the practicability of this quantitative
requirement."1
The one-m-three standard had its genesis in an ABA Tax Section Task
Force Report that interpreted ABA Opinion 85-352 subsequent to issuance
of that opinion.5' The Task Force Report stated that "[a] position having
49. Practitioner Survey, App. B, Question 9.
50. Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(a)(4)(i).
51. See, e.g., Letter from David R. Brennan to the Internal Revenue Service, supra
note 9; David L. Brunori, AICPA Continues Fight for Simplification; Leadership Bemoans
"Workload Compression," Preparer Penalty Regs., Mar. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, 94
TNT 55-3; Letter from Patricia Lewis et al. to The Honorable Shirley D. Peterson, supra
note 9; Letter from Lawrence F Portnoy to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 9;
Raby, supra note 9; Letter from Steven C. Salch to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note
9.
52. See Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, reprinted in 39
TAX LAW. 635 (1986) and in STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 11, supra note 7, 2004, at
3596 [hereinafter 85-352 Task Force Report]. The ABA Tax Section originally suggested
a version of the RPOS standard in a proposal to revise ABA Opinion 314. See ABA Section
of Taxation, Proposed Revision to Formal Op. 314 (1984), reprinted in BERNARD WOLFMAN
& JAMEs P HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS iN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 71 (2d ed. 1985).
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only a 5 or 10 percent likelihood of success, if litigated, should not meet
the standard."'53 But "[a] position having a likelihood of success closely
approaching one-third should meet the standard."'" The Task Force
Report's one-third percentage may have been meant as a safe-harbor, so
that positions with a chance somewhat below one-third would be sufficient.
In addition, although the Committee on Standards of Tax Practice and the
Council of the Section of Taxation approved the Task Force Report,' it
was not adopted by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Profession-
al Responsibility 6 Hence, the Task Force Report was never officially
adopted as an ABA position. Nevertheless, the one-m-three formulation has
been adopted as a minimum standard in the Circular 230 amendments (as
well as the preparer penalty regulations),' and it appears to be entering the
folklore of taxation.
This is unfortunate because a quantified formulation of the RPOS
standard has significant drawbacks. In the first place, the one-in-three
formulation imparts an appearance of precision and objectivity to the RPOS
standard that simply does not exist. Although practitioners may sometimes
discuss the chances of a particular position's success in terms of odds, in
the difficult cases, few would be willing to characterize the accuracy of
their oddsmakmng as much more than educated guesses. In the close cases,
what practitioner can truly believe that the odds of success are thirty-three
percent and not, say, thirty percent or twenty-five percent? Perhaps one
who is under a delusion of being endowed with divine omniscience would
be so bold, but few others are likely to possess such hubris. One is
reminded of the supposed medieval practice of determining the number of
angels that can dance on the head of a pin.
The ABA RPOS standard set out in Opinion 85-352 does not actually
mention a quantified standard. The ABA did not officially adopt the one-
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility modified the Tax
Section's proposal by issuing Opinion 85-352. The purpose of the Task Force report
apparently was to counteract what the Task Force perceived might be adverse inferences
from these modifications to the version of ABA Opinion 85-352 that the Tax Section
originally proposed.
53. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 52, at 638.
54. Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added).
55. See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE I 214.020, 13
Tax Transactions Libr. (CCH) (1992) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE I].
56. Id.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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in-three formulation of the Tax Section Task Force.58 Moreover, several
practice groups and commentators have opposed a quantified formulation
of the RPOS standard on grounds that it is unrealistic. 9 One commentator
pithily summarized the arguments against quantification of the RPOS
standard:
Frankly, I think it is naive and unrealistic. I have been involved in the
litigation of tax cases for the last thirty years and have never been able
to predict a specific value for a client's claim in litigation. It seems to
me that the realistic possibility of success standard is the standard one
generally employs m approaching the case from a settlement or litigation
standpoint. To cloud that issue with percentages is simply unrealistic. '
The preparer penalty regulations do provide some examples of the one-m-
three standard, but they involve obvious situations and are basically
worthless in the difficult case.6 In the problem situations, the practitioner
is left with the task of divining the odds of success for positions that by
definition are ambiguous at best. The price of being proven wrong can be
the preparer penalty under I.R.C. § 6694, or in more extreme cases,
possible sanctions under Circular 230.62 The practitioner is thus left
58. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57
59. See, e.g., Letter from Harvey L. Coustan to The Honorable Shirley D. Peterson,
supra note 9; Letter from Patricia Lewis et al. to The Honorable Shirley D. Peterson, supra
note 9; Letter from Lawrence F Portnoy to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 9;
Letter from Steven C. Salch to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 9.
60. Letter from David R. Brennan to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 9.
Another commentator termed the one-m-three standard "ludicrous." Brunori, supra note 51
(quoting Harvey L. Coustan, Chairman, AICPA Federal Tax Division).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3) (1991).
62. Circular 230 provides that failure to meet the RPOS standard will subject a
practitioner to suspension or disbarment only if the violation is "willful, reckless, or a result
of gross incompetence." Circular 230, supra note 2, §§ 10.34(b), 10.52. Hence, an
occasional inadvertent deviation from the RPOS standard should not result in Circular 230
sanctions. Such a deviation, however, could bring an assertion of the I.R.C. § 6694
preparer penalty If the IRS asserts the preparer penalty, the regulations provide that the
practitioner can raise a reasonable cause and good faith defense, but in that event, the
burden of proof is on the practitioner to prove reasonable cause and good faith. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)-(e) (1991). Moreover, the Internal Revenue Manual now provides that
a determination of whether the preparer penalty should be assessed will be made in every
examination and recorded m the examination workpapers. Consolidated Penalty Handbook,
6 Internal Revenue Man. (CCH) pt. (20)(11)13, at 50,402; see Larry B. Wolod, Stricter
Disclosure Standards Under Section 6662: Who Will Step Forward and Pay the $496 Million
Tab?, Feb. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, 94 TNT 34-72.
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exposed for a failure of oddsmaking acumen determined by resort to
hindsight.63
Aside from the nature of oddsmaking as an educated guess at best,
another difficulty is that tax positions are not necessarily all-or-nothing
propositions. Many issues are settled by compromise somewhere between
the IRS's and taxpayers's positions. The one-m-three standard does not
seem to take this into account. Rather, it focusses on the odds of either
winning or losing completely Again, this approach does not conform to
reality
Perhaps a more satisfactory approach if the one-in-three standard
remains would be to phrase the rule in terms of an expected settlement
percentage.64 For example, the question would be what is the settlement
value of this position, rather than what are the odds of winning it
completely Consequently, a position that the practitioner estimates has a
settlement value of thirty-three cents on the dollar would meet the RPOS
standard. Tius approach would still involve an educated guess, but it would
at least take into account the realities of settlement and compromise inherent
in the tax enforcement process.
Finally, the practicalities of enforcing a quantified standard are
daunting. When the IRS asserts that a practitioner has violated the standard
the resultant proceeding is likely to break down into two phases. First, the
parties will present expert opinion testimony about whether the practitioner
met the one-in-three standard. The testimony on this issue is likely to be
conflicting, and the tribunal must make a subjective evaluation of the
opposing experts' views.' If the tribunal finds that the practitioner did not
meet the one-m-three standard, or if, as is more likely, the issue is not
clear-cut, the tribunal will then determine whether the practitioner acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith in the case of the preparer penalty,
or whether the practitioner's conduct was willful, reckless, or a result of
gross incompetence in the case of Circular 230 sanctions.' Both of these
63. See Letter from Steven C. Salch to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 9.
64. See Letter from Patricia L. Lewis et al. to The Honorable Shirley D. Peterson,
supra note 9; Raby, supra note 9.
65. See Letter from Steven C. Salch to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 9
66. Id. The preparer penalty regulations explicitly make reasonable cause and good
faith on the part of the practitioner a defense to the penalty Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)-(e)
(1991). Circular 230 does not explicitly make reasonable cause and good faith a defense.
It may accomplish a similar effect, however, by providing that sanctions against a
practitioner will not apply for violation of the RPOS standard, unless the violation was
"willful, reckless, or a result of gross incompetence." Circular 230, supra note 2,
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inquiries introduce an unavoidable element of subjectivity and ultimately
lead to the issue of whether the practitioner acted prudently, and whether
it was unreasonable and in bad faith for the practitioner to advise the
particular tax return position.6' If this is the ultimate issue anyway,
quantification of the RPOS standard only adds perplexity, rather than
objectivity, to the process.68
The one-m-three standard adds no real objectivity, lends a false air of
precision to an inherently imprecise process, and is impracticable to apply
The IRS should eliminate it from the preparer penalty regulations and from
Circular 230.
C. A RPOS Standard for the IRS
The preparer penalty regulations, Circular 230, and relevant profes-
sional standards all impose one version or another of the RPOS standard on
tax practitioners. This duty flows from the double duty of the practitioner
to the system as a whole as well as to the client.69 Just as citizens have a
duty to "turn square corners when they deal with the government,"'7
likewise the IRS should have a concomitant duty to turn square corners
when it deals with taxpayers and practitioners.
Some practitioners have voiced concern that such a duty, although
implicit in the nature of government service, is not explicitly set out m
current law 71 There is a perception that some IRS employees propose
adjustments that fail to meet a standard comparable to the RPOS standard
§§ 10.34(b), 10.52. Circular 230, in turn, defines "reckless conduct" as "a highly
unreasonable omission or misrepresentation involving an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care that a practitioner should observe under the circumstances." Id.
§ 10.510). All of this taken together implies that good faith and reasonable cause on the
part of the practitioner should be a valid defense to Circular 230 sanctions.
67 Letter from Steven C. Salch to the Internal Revenue Service, supra note 9.
68. Id.
69. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE II, supra note 7, 105. In 1952, Norris
Darrell summed up the dichotomy in an unpublished paper: "You have a course of double
duty: a duty to do your best for the client and not to bring the lightning down upon hun, and
a duty to live up to your professional responsibility." Quoted in Rowen, supra note 1, at
237
70. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920)
(Holmes, J.).
71. See Letter from Patricia L. Lewis et al. to The Honorable Shirley D. Peterson,
supra note 9.
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and that they sometimes raise issues and assert penalties that have little
merit for the purpose of inducing a settlement. 7'
Practitioners must meet the Circular 230 and preparer penalty
standards under threat of severe sanction. Fairness dictates that the IRS
should hold itself to a similar standard when dealing with taxpayers and
practitioners.' The Service should promulgate ethical standards for IRS
examination personnel that parallel standards for practitioners under I.R.C.
§ 6694 and Circular 230. This would enhance taxpayer confidence m the
system by explicitly holding IRS personnel to ethical standards similar to
those govermng taxpayers and practitioners.74
IlL. Elevation of the Disclosure Standard for Taxpayers
The 1993 Act established a new nmmum reporting standard-new
reasonable basis-that taxpayers must meet before adequate disclosure will
absolve from the accuracy-related penalty a tax return position that is not
supported by substantial authority The House version of the bill would
have extended the new reasonable basis standard to the § 6694 preparer
penalty as well. However, the Senate version of the bill and, ultimately,
the Conference Report limited the application of the heightened standard to
the accuracy-related penalty while retaining the old rules for the preparer
penalty 75
Formerly, adequate disclosure would absolve a substandard position
from the accuracy-related penalty as long as the position was not frivolous.
72. Id. That IRS employees may sometimes be less above reproach than Caesar's wife
was vividly brought home recently by allegations of IRS employee misuse of computer
information to gain access to private information of private acquaintances and celebrities.
See Hubert H. Herring, At the I.R.S., Just Looking, N.Y TIMEs, July 24, 1994, at C2;
Wandering Eyes at the IRS, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 1, 1994, at 13; Who's
Reading Your Tax Return. ., WASH. POST, July 23, 1994, at A21.
73. See Letter from Patricia L. Lewis et al. to The Honorable Shirley D. Peterson,
supra note 9.
74. See id.
75. See S. 1134, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. CONP REP. No. 213, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 669 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1358; see also OBRA
of 1993, § 13251, Rita L. Zeidner, Conferees' Double Standard is Good News for
Preparers, Not Taxpayers, 60 TAX NOTES 689 (1993). The Senate apparently dropped the
preparer penalty portion of the bill because of a procedural objection to it under the Budget
Act. Confusingly, the Senate Committee Report indicated that the preparer penalty
provisions remained intact. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
FISCAL YEAR 1994 BUDGET RECONCILIATION RECOMMENDATIONS 219-20 (Comm. Print
1993); Wolod, supra note 62.
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Tius absolution for adequate disclosure was based on the notion that overly
aggressive tax reporting positions had their genesis in taxpayers playing the
audit lottery by burying the positions on their tax returns.76 The regulations
defined the term "frivolous" as "patently improper."'77 Moreover, the
amendments to Circular 230 include a similar "not frivolous" provision
absolving an adequately disclosed position that falls below the RPOS
standard from sanction under Circular 230.71
The 1993 Act, however, changed the statutory rmnmum disclosure
standard for the accuracy-related penalty from requiring that the tax return
position be not frivolous to requiring that the position have a reasonable
basis. The House Committee Report explained that: "Under the bill, the
'reasonable basis' standard replaces the 'not frivolous' standard for
purposes of the accuracy-related and income tax return preparer penalties.
The Committee intends that 'reasonable basis' be a relatively high standard
of tax reporting."79  The Committee further stated that the former not
frivolous standard did not "sufficiently discourage taxpayers and preparers
from taking unreasonable return positions."I Accordingly, the Committee
decided to encourage compliance by imposing "tougher standards.""1 The
"tougher standard"-reasonable basis-did not survive the legislative
process in the case of the preparer penalty, but it remained intact in the
case of the accuracy-related penalty
Hence, now a tax return position must meet at least a "reasonable
basis" standard for adequate disclosure to exonerate the position from the
substantial understatement and disregard portions of the accuracy-related
penalty Moreover, disclosure will no longer be relevant in the case of the
negligence penalty because the standard for negligence is already reasonable
basis.' This is a step in the wrong direction. The new standard revives
the old and rejected reasonable basis standard. The RPOS standard
replaced the reasonable basis standard because the latter had been
76. See Jerome Kurtz et al., Discussion on "Questionable Positions, " 32 TAX LAW.
13, 15 (1978) (discussing problems with reporting standards).
77 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (1993).
78. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356, 46,359 (1992) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1),
(4)) (proposed Oct. 8, 1992).
79. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 103D CONG., IST SESS., FISCAL YEAR 1994
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interpreted too laxly I In the alternative, the new use of the term
"reasonable basis" will require creation of an entirely new standard. The
new reasonable basis will likely run contrary to the taxpayer's traditional
right to litigate a tax return position prior to payment of tax by setting the
standard higher for a disclosed position than for a litigable position.'
The main impetus for the stir of activity regarding standards for tax
return positions over the past decade and a half has been concern with
taxpayers taking aggressive tax return positions and betting on the audit
lottery that the positions will go unchallenged.Y Although the details differ,
the general consensus has been that the remedy should lie m setting tax
return position standards higher than the old reasonable basis standard' and
83. See Richard C. Stark, Let's Reconsider the "Reasonable Basis" Standard, 59 TAX
NOTES 1845 (1993). In ABA Opinion 85-352, reprinted in STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE
I, supra note 7, 2003, at 3566, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility stated its reason for moving away from the reasonable basis standard:
The Committee is informed that the standard of "reasonable basis" has been
construed by many lawyers to support the use of any colorable claim on a tax
return to justify exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit selection
process. This view is not uiversally held, and the Committee does not believe
that the reasonable basis standard, properly interpreted and applied, permits this
construction.
However, the committee is persuaded that as a result of serious controversy
over this standard and its persistent criticism by distinguished members of the
tax bar, IRS officials and members of Congress, sufficient doubt has been
created regarding the validity of the standard so as to erode its effectiveness as
an ethical guideline. For this reason, the Committee has concluded that it
should be restated.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
84. So far the Treasury has punted on defining the term "reasonable basis" under the
new act by reserving the definition in the temporary and proposed regulations. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-7T(d)(1) (1994); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3), 59 Fed. Reg.
12,565 (1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3)) (proposed Mar. 1, 1994).
85. See Kurtz, supra note 76.
86. The reasonable basis standard was originally enunciated in ABA Opinion 314.
According to Opinion 314, a lawyer asked to advise a client m the course of preparation of
the tax return "may freely urge the statement of positions most favorable to the client just
as long as there is reasonable basis for those positions." ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965), reprinied in 51 ABA J. 671 (1965) and in STANDARDS OF
TAX PRACICE II, supra note 7, 2001, app. The reasonable basis standard originally may
have been intended to set a fairly high standard. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE I, supra
note 55, 214.02; Kenneth L. Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions on a Client's
Federal Tax Return: An Analysis of the Revised Section 6694(a) Standard, 47 TAX NOTES
971, 972 (1990). Nevertheless, respect for the standard gradually eroded over the next 20
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that positions falling below a new higher standard should be specially
disclosed to the IRS.
The reasonable basis standard proved unworkable, thus requiring a
new standard under wich the audit lottery option would not seem so
attractive to taxpayers who had to disclose their questionable positions to
the IRS when they filed their returns. Professional associations, Congress,
and the Treasury reworked the reasonable basis standard into the more
stringent RPOS and substantial authority standards,87 but in most cases in
which a position fell below the required standard, adequate disclosure could
cure the failure.'
Disclosure did not absolve a substandard position only when the
position fell below a low minimum standard. That standard was "not
frivolous." The regulations defined a frivolous position as one that is
"patently improper." Hence, as long as the tax return position was not
patently improper, adequate disclosure absolved the position from penalties
or other sanctions.
years. Some only half-facetiously referred to the standard as the chuckle test or the laugh
test (if the lawyer can advance the position without chuckling or laughing). See Theodore
C. Falk, Tax Etucs, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Opinion 85-352, 39
TAX LAW. 643, 644 (1986); IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal Tying Ethics Standard for Tax
Return Preparers to Taxpayer Understatement Penalty, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at
K-6 (Feb. 24, 1987) (quoting Professor Michael Graetz).
87 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6694 (Supp. V 1993); Circular 230, supra note 2; ABA
Opinion 85-352, reprinted in STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE II, supra note 7, 2003, at
3566.
88. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6694 (Supp. V 1993); Circular 230, supra note 2,
§ 10.34 (a)(1)(i). The exception to adequate disclosure absolving a substandard tax return
position is ABA Opinion 88-352. The Opinion does not explicitly state that disclosure
exonerates a position that fails to meet the RPOS standard (substandard position). The
original Tax Section Task Force Report that proposed the RPOS standard stated that if the
RPOS standard is not met, disclosure will not cure the defect. See 85-352 Task Force
Report, supra note 52. It stated: "If there is not a realistic possibility of success, if litigated,
the new standard could not be met by disclosure or 'flagging' of the position on the return."
Id. at 639. Subsequently, however, the ABA Tax Section, in comments on proposed
revisions to Treasury Circular 230, took the view that a return position that does not meet
the RPOS standard may be taken, provided the position is not frivolous and is either:
(1) adequately disclosed; or (2) presented on an amended return filed as a claim for refund.
See STANDARDS OF TAX PRAcTICE I, supra note 55, 214.0242; Letter from John B. Jones,
Jr. to Leslie S. Shapiro, reprinted in Sax, supra note 17, at 62-63.
89. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended in 1993), 1.6694-2(b)(c)(2) (as
amended in 1993); Circular 230, supra note 2, § 10.34(a)(4)(ii).
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The justification for setting the disclosure standard at not frivolous is
the taxpayer's right to litigate a tax return position prior to payment of the
tax. The taxpayer is entitled to a prepayment forum m which to assert his
position. This is the ratson d'etre of the Tax Court and is a fundamental
feature of the federal tax enforcement process.' The corollary of this is
that, at least within some range of possible outcomes, the taxpayer should
be able to assert a position on the tax return that the IRS may well contest,
even though the taxpayer's position is not certainly correct, or perhaps not
even probably correct. This proposition is not controversial.9
90. The Revenue Act of 1924 created the Tax Court (formerly the Board of Tax
Appeals) for the specific purpose of providing the taxpayer a prepayment forum for
contesting disputed tax return positions. The House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1924 stated:
The committee recommends the establishment of a Board of Tax Appeals to
which a taxpayer may appeal prior to the payment of an additional assessment
of income, excess-profits, war profits, or estate taxes. Although a taxpayer
may, after payment of his tax, bring suit for the recovery thereof and thus
secure a judicial determination of the questions involved, he can not, in view of
section 3224 of the revised statutes, which prohibits suit to enjoin the collection
of taxes, secure such determination prior to the payment of the tax. The right
of appeal after the payment of the tax is an incomplete remedy, and does little
to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect assessment. The payment of
a large additional tax on income received several years previous and which may
have, since its receipt, been either wiped out by subsequent losses, invested in
nonliquid assets, or spent, sometimes forces taxpayers into bankruptcy, and
often causes great financial hardship and sacrifice. These results are not
remedied by permitting the taxpayer to sue for the recovery of the tax after this
payment. He is entitled to an appeal and to a determination of his liability for
the tax prior to its payment.
H.R. REP No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924) (emphasis added).
91. See James P Holden, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice: A Commentary, 9
VA. TAX REV 771, 773 (1990). One might argue that the jurat on the form 1040 requires
the taxpayer to be certain of a position's correctness. It states: "Under penalties of perjury,
I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statements, and
to the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete." 2 Fed. Tax
Forms (CCH) 500, at 2044 (emphasis added). Also, § 7206 makes it a felony for a
person to willfully make and subscribe a return "which he does not believe to be true and
correct as to every material matter." I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the true and correct belief criterion has not prevailed as the required standard,
largely because a rule that depends too much on the taxpayer's subjective state of mind
would not be workable. See Rowen, supra note 1, at 250-51. At least one commentator,
however, has argued for a "true and correct" standard of reporting. See Johnson, supra
note 34, at 1523.
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The more difficult question is how strong a tax return position has to
be m order for a taxpayer to assert that position on the return with adequate
disclosure. The standard for an adequately disclosed position should not be
as high as for an undisclosed position because a fully disclosed position
does not present the same audit lottery possibilities for a taxpayer as an
undisclosed position. The standard for an adequately disclosed tax return
position should be set at a level sufficient to protect the right to prepayment
litigation of a tax return position, but should be high enough to prohibit
positions with practically no chance to succeed in litigation.
Formerly, the accuracy-related' and preparer penalties9' regulations (as
well as the proposed Circular 230 amendments) set the disclosure standard
at not frivolous. The accuracy-related penalty regulations defined frivolous
as "patently improper," and commentators objected to this formulation on
the ground that it was too vague and would require the development of new
case law to further define the meaning of the term.' Commentators
suggested a standard of "not litigable" rather than "patently improper, 195
but the IRS rejected this standard as too lawyer-oriented.9
The not litigable standard is preferable to either the not frivolous or
reasonable basis standard. The justification for the disclosure exemption is
the right of a taxpayer to prepayment litigation of a tax return position. If
tlus is the basis of the exemption, it makes sense that the minmum standard
92. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (1991).
93. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(2) (1991).
94. See Stark, supra note 83, at 1846. Comments on the proposed regulations
criticized this definition for not including a bad faith component. T.D. 8381 pmbl., 1992-1
C.B. 374, 377 The IRS rejected these comments on the ground that a purely objective
standard was most appropriate. Id. One must question, however, whether "patently
improper" is really objective.
95. The Civil Penalties Task Force of the ABA Section of Taxation proposed the
following definition for "frivolous" in the proposed accuracy-related penalty regulations:
A "frivolous" position with respect to an item is one that is not litigable.
A position is litigable only if, to the best of the taxpayer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and is not interposed for any improper
purpose. Other words used to describe positions that fall below the minimum
requirements for reporting a position on a tax return, such as "lacks a reasonable
basis" or "patently improper," have the same meaning.
ABA Section of Taxation, ABA Task Force Members Instruct Service on Reforming Reform,
June 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, 91 TNT 123-46, quoted in Stark, supra note 83, at 1846.
96. See T.D. 8381 pmbl., 1992-1 C.B. 374, 377
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for an adequately disclosed tax return position should be whether the
position is in fact a litigable one. Current procedural rules prescribe a
litigating standard for actions brought in the Tax Court and in the federal
courts. 7 The Tax Court Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
both state that the signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification
by the attorney or party that:
[r"o the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable mquny, it is well grounded m fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose. 110
The standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Tax
Court Rules forms the basis for the ABA RPOS standard. The ABA RPOS
standard provides that an attorney can advise a position when there is a
realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated. The standard for
advising a tax return position is stated in Opimon 85-352 as follows:
In summary, a lawyer may advise reporting a position on a return even
where the lawyer believes the position probably will not prevail, there
is no "substantial authority" in support of the position, and there will be
no disclosure of the position in the return. However, the position to be
asserted must be one which the lawyer in good faith believes is
warranted in existing law or can be supported by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. This requires
that there is some realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigat-
ed.101
Hence, a not litigable standard conforms to the ABA RPOS standard.
Moreover, it is consistent' with the virtually identical AICPA RPOS
standard. 102
97 See Stark, supra note 83, at 1846.
98. See T.C.R. 33(b).
99. FED. R. Civ P 11 (prior to Dec. 1, 1993).
100. Id., T.C.R. 33(b).
101. ABA Opinion 85-352, reprinted in STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE ff, supra note
7, 2003, at 3657 (emphasis added).
102. See AICPA, Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice, (1988 Rev.) No. 1,
reprnted in STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE II, supra note 7, 2006, at 3659. The AICPA
standard provides:
A CPA should not recommend to a client that a position be taken with
respect to the tax treatment of any item on a return unless the CPA has a good
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Adopting a not litigable standard for disclosure would, therefore,
contribute to a desirable consistency in standards. In addition, the not
litigable standard conforms to Federal Rule 11 and Tax Court Rule 33(b),
which have a history of interpretation behind them. By contrast, the
reinstitution of the reasonable basis standard as a "relatively high standard,"
in the words of the legislative history, 3 may bring a new version of the
standard that has been discredited, along with the attendant problems of
interpretation and application of the new version. This will result in
inconsistent application, an inability of practitioners to understand and
comply with the new version, and a consequent lessening of respect for the
new version-the very problems the RPOS standard was supposed to
ameliorate. 104
Congress enacted the accuracy-related penalties, the ABA and AICPA
adopted the RPOS tax reporting standard, and Treasury revised Circular
230 principally to remedy unscrupulous exploitation of the audit lottery 11
Requiring adequate disclosure of a position that may fall below the penalty
standards appropriately addresses this problem. The requirements for
adequate disclosure, such as filing a Form 8275 (the "please audit me now"
form), or filing in accordance with an annual revenue procedure1°6 are
sufficient to put the IRS on notice of positions that may fall below the
standard. Furthermore, adequate disclosure is compelling evidence of good
faith on the part of the taxpayer or practitioner.
In general, substantial penalties should not be imposed on taxpayers
who act m good faith in the exercise of their right to prepayment litigation
of a tax return position, but who turn out to be wrong in hindsight.
Nevertheless, that may be exactly the result of the new supposedly stronger
reasonable basis mimmum disclosure standard. This, of course, will
faith belief that the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained
administratively or judicially on its merits if challenged.
Id.
103. House COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 317
104. See Stark, supra note 83, at 1846.
105. See Stark, supra note 83, at 1845; see also Kurtz, supra note 76.
106. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(2) (1991) (disclosure on Form 8275 or 8275-R
absolved from negligence penalty prior to 1993 Tax Act); id. § 1.6662-4() (1991)
(disclosure on Form 8275, 8275-R, or on return in accordance with annual revenue
procedure absolves from substantial understatement penalty); id. § 1.6694-2(c)(3) (as
amended in 1991) (disclosure on Form 8275, 8275-R, or on return in accordance with
annual revenue procedure absolves from income tax return preparer penalty); Circular 230,
supra note 2, § 10.34(a)(1)(ii) (adequate disclosure avoids Circular 230 sanctions).
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depend on how stringently courts and the IRS interpret the new standard.
Congress has stated that it intends that the new version of reasonable basis
be a "relatively high standard of tax reporting.""° Hence, this new higher
standard may result in the imposition of penalties on taxpayers who act in
perfectly good faith in taking and disclosing a tax return position, but who
turn out to have been wrong in hindsight. This is true despite the possible
availability of the reasonable cause and good faith defense in I.R.C.
§ 6664(c) because the good faith taxpayer may not always be able to take
advantage of that defense.'
Additionally, the new reasonable basis standard may deprive taxpayers
of the time-honored right to prepayment litigation to the extent that it
prevents taxpayers from taking adequately disclosed positions that would be
litigable under Tax Court Rule 33(b). This right has a long and well
established history,11 and steps that diminish it should not be taken lightly
Tax practitioners have already expressed their dissatisfaction with the new
version, and this dissatisfaction can only be expected to grow as more and
more taxpayers confront the new version." 0
Finally, instituting a reasonable basis minimum standard for taxpayers
under I.R.C. § 6662 while retaining the not frivolous standard for income
tax return preparers under I.R.C. § 6694 injects an additional element of
inconsistency into the already complex rules governing tax return positions.
There is, in effect, a double standard for disclosure, one for taxpayers (the
"new improved" reasonable basis standard) and another for income tax
return preparers (the old not frivolous standard). At best, this double
107 See HousE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at 317
108. See I.R.C. § 6664(c) (Supp. V 1993). The taxpayer may not be able to prove
reasonable cause and good faith. Because the standard of reasonableness is part of the
reasonable basis test and also part of the reasonable cause and good faith exception, failure
to meet the reasonable basis test may carry with it failure to meet the reasonable cause and
good faith exception. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (1991). The regulations provide:
The most important factor [in determining application of the exception] is
the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability.
Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an
honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of the
experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer.
Id. (emphasis added).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
110. See Rules Do Not Implement Congress' Intent on Accuracy-Related Penalty,
Groups Say, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 130, at G-3 (July 11, 1994); Rita L. Zeidner,
Penalty Changes Will Do More Harm Than Good, Practitioners Say, 60 TAX NOTES 428,
429 (1993).
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standard will engender confusion and, at worst, may result in conflicts of
interest between taxpayers and practitioners. For example, suppose a
taxpayer is considering a position in the gray area between reasonable basis
and not frivolous. The taxpayer will be constrained by the new reasonable
basis standard for purposes of the accuracy-related penalty, but the
practitioner will be guided by the not frivolous standard for purposes of the
preparer penalty The taxpayer may be reluctant to make adequate
disclosure if it appears that reasonable basis may be present (because
reasonable basis avoids the negligence penalty in any event), but the
practitioner, to protect his own interests, may want to disclose in order to
avoid the preparer penalty if the position is below RPOS but is not
frivolous. The new standard may result in the opposite of its intended
effect-less disclosure rather than more-because taxpayers (if not
practitioners) may be more willing to take their chances on nondisclosure
in such situations.
The new reasonable basis minimum disclosure standard was originally
proposed as part of the 1993 budget package."' Hence, the President and
Congress may have intended it as a revenue measure." 2 If so, fiddling with
the ethical rules that have been formulated so painstakingly over the past
decade and a half is an extremely poor way to raise a relatively small
111. See H.R. 2141, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14252(a)(1) (1993). The proposal
provided:
Clause (i) of section 6662(d)(2)(B) (relating to reduction for understatement due
to position of taxpayer on disclosed item) is amended to read as follows:
"(ii) any item if-
(I) the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are adequately
disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the return, and
(II) there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of such item by the
taxpayer."
Id. The language was subsequently enacted through H.R. 2264 in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13251, 107 Stat. 312, 531.
112. See Zeidner, supra note 75, at 689; Wolod, supra note 62. The Ways and Means
Committee listed the new reasonable basis standard m its Committee Report under "Revenue
Raising Provisions." HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, at XIII. The Joint
Committee on Taxation estimated that the original reasonable basis proposal (applying the
reasonable basis standard to both the accuracy-related taxpayer penalty and to the income
tax return preparer penalty) would produce additional revenue (presumably through
taxpayers taking less aggressive positions to avoid the penalty and through enhanced penalty
collections) of $484 million over the five year period 1994-98. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE MARKUP OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS
(JCX-1-93) (1993), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 85, at L-3 (May 5, 1993); see
Zeidner, supra note 75, at 689.
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amount of additional revenue. The rejection of the near consensus on
disclosure of tax return positions, along with the resultant damage to the
integrity of the tax system, will far outweigh any paltry revenue gain.
Congress should change the law to permit a taxpayer to take an adequately
disclosed position without penalty, provided the position is litigable under
Tax Court Rule 33(b) and Federal Rule 11.
IV A Survey of Tax Practitioner Attitudes
The authors took an informal survey of practitioners' attitudes in
conjunction with this Article. Two hundred-fifty-six surveys were mailed
to tax attorneys throughout Virginia. Practitioners returned ninety-seven
surveys. The survey results are reported in Appendix B.
The survey results reflect consensus in several areas. For instance,
most of the respondents were unhappy with the state of affairs that exists
in the reporting laws today When asked whether they thought the ABA
and IRS rules governing lawyers in advising tax returns were consistent,
clearly defined, and reasonably easy to apply, 82.5 % of the respondents felt
that they were not, and only one respondent (1%) thought that they were.
One respondent added: "They may be clearly defined academically, but not
m the heat of practice with a fee-paying client." A large majority (71.1%)
of the respondents disagreed with ABA Opinion 85-352's requirement that
a lawyer ,withdraw representation if his client takes a position that falls
below RPOS. Only 13.4% of the respondents agreed with this require-
ment. One respondent noted that "this denies the client representation
which is central to our judicial system." Nearly one-half of the respondents
(44.3%) disagreed with the change in the 1993 Act that requires a position
to have at least a reasonable basis and be disclosed in order for a taxpayer
to be absolved of the substantial understatement penalty, while leaving the
not frivolous standard for the preparer penalty unchanged. Only 34% of
the respondents favored the law About one-fifth (18.6%) of the practitio-
ners were undecided and three respondents left the question blank. While
this indecision may result from the newness of the law, a significant
percentage of the respondents were unsatisfied with the double standard that
the 1993 Act created.
The survey also illustrates some confusion over how to quantify the
various standards in practice. When asked if they would advise a client to
take a position with RPOS but without substantial authority, 45.4% of the
practitioners answered no and 35 % replied that they would. Nearly one in
five lawyers did not know what they would do (19.6%). An overwhelming
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majority (93.8%) of lawyers, however, would favor taking the position if
the client made disclosure. One respondent observed: "Clients aren't
interested in the murky distinctions between 'reasonable basis,' 'realistic
possibility of success,' 'nonfivolous,' etc. I can't quantify when a position
has a one in three chance of success. No one can." Thus, the difference
between RPOS and substantial authority (33.3% versus 40%) seemed to be
difficult for the respondents to quantify While lawyers did not believe that
they could tell the difference between RPOS and substantial authority, they
seemed to think that the IRS could and would. Furthermore, most
preparers and taxpayers are "good guys" who will not take a tenuous
position without letting the IRS know that they are unsure of it themselves.
The respondents were more certain of the distinction between
reasonable basis and RPOS (10-20% versus 33.3 %), than the smaller gap
RPOS and substantial authority (33.3% versus 40%). Most of the
practitioners (76.3 %) would not advise a client to take a position with only
a reasonable basis instead of RPOS if the client was unwilling to make
disclosure. One reason for their hesitance may be the influence of ABA
Opimon 85-352, which would force the lawyer to withdraw if the client
takes tus position. If, on the other hand, the client was willing to make
disclosure, a majority of respondents (58.8%) agreed that they would advise
their client to take the position. Some respondents may have felt that the
act of disclosure itself was a sign of good faith. Coupled with the broader
range of authorities that may be used under 85-352, some respondents may
have felt that they could raise the possibility of a client's position enough
so that they would not have to withdraw representation.
Another area in which the respondents agreed was how many reporting
standards to have and what the standards should be. Nearly two-thirds
(59.8%) of the respondents agreed with the proposition that a single,
uniform reporting standard should be used for all reporting purposes, and
only 15.5% opposed this proposition. Significantly, almost one-fourth
(24.7%) of the practitioners were undecided. Some of this indecision may
be explained by one of the respondent's comments: "A single standard
would be nice dependent upon who sets the standard." When asked
whether they thought the standard that requires a good faith belief that a tax
return position has a realistic possibility of being sustained admstratively
or judicially on the merits would be the most appropriate single standard,
72.2% answered in the affirmative. Just over 11% disagreed. One
respondent who disagreed commented that the standard was "too low-wild,
wild west approach." Most of the practitioners, however, concluded that
a single RPOS-based reporting standard would be the most appropriate.
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Finally, the majority of the respondents (65 %) felt that the availability
of secondary sources for a preparer to determine whether a position has
substantial authority should be expanded. Of the 17.5% in disagreement,
one respondent stated: "Including articles and treatises presents too many
variables if the goal is to narrow the range of acceptable interpretations."
Despite these dissenters, most of the respondents recognized the everyday
necessity for consulting secondary sources as the law has grown more
complex and the number of standards has proliferated.
In conclusion, the informal survey bears out many of this Article's
points. Many practitioners want some type of guidance, although it is
unclear by which standard they wish to be governed. While lawyers
professed an ability to divine between RPOS and reasonable basis, when the
question became one of RPOS versus substantial authority, they were much
more comfortable in advising their client to take a position if they had the
safety net of disclosure. ABA Opinion 85-352 was unpopular because it
creates more problems than it solves by requiring a lawyer to withdraw if
the client does not wish to disclose and RPOS has not been met.
Much discussion is required before a single standard is imposed. The
majority of respondents, however, did favor going to a single standard.
The majority might have been larger if they knew what the standard would
be. The ABA Opinion 85-352 RPOS standard was popular with the
respondents. Finally, most respondents favored expanding the number of
secondary sources available to them.
Postscript
Since 1966, I have had the privilege of attempting to teach literally
scores of law students something about one of the greatest of abominations
created by a mankind corrupted by original sin-the Internal Revenue Code.
During that time, I have often mused on the idea that perhaps their and my
time could be better spent on something (almost anything) else, such as
planting corn or tomatoes. I leave with one consolation-during all that
time I have strived and sometimes- succeeded in teaching law students how
to keep money out of the hands of the federal government and in the
pockets of their clients!
J Timothy Philipps
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Appendix A
Reporting Standards Summary
Standard Percentage Descrption Disclosure
Correct Near 100% Near certainty Not needed
More likely than Over 50% Probably correct Not relevant
not
Substantial Around 40 % Authority sub- Absolves




Reasonable pos- 33.33% Authority not Absolves
sibility of being substantial but § 6694
sustained on the still has a decent
merits (§ 6694) chance; relevant
authorities limited
Reasonable 33.33% or Same as above, Does not
possibility of somewhat less except good faith absolve
success if required and rele- (ABA 85-352)
litigated vant authorities
broader
Reasonable 10-20% Arguable but Does not
basis fairly unlikely to absolve
prevail
Non-frivolous 5-10% Not patently im- Does not
proper but less absolve
than reasonable
basis
Frivolous 0-5% Patently Does not
improper absolve
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Appendix B
Survey Results
The following results were tabulated from the mnety-seven surveys that
were returned.
Lawyer interviews Client with regard to income tax position A (relating to
a substantial item on the tax return), which Client wishes to take and
determines that position A has a reasonable basis and is neither frivolous
nor fraudulent. Lawyer also determines that the position lacks substantial
authority under IRC § 6662, and that the IRS is very likely to disagree with
position A. Lawyer advises Client of these findings. Lawyer further
advises Client of the possibility of avoiding the substantial understatement
penalty by making adequate disclosure of position A and advises Client to
do so. Client declines to make adequate disclosure. See Holden, supra
note 91, at 775.
In the hypothetical above, Position A has a reasonable basis but does not
have substantial authority For questions 1 and 2, assuming that Position
A has a Reasonable Possibility of Success if litigated (RPOS) (ABA
Opimon 85-352):
1. Would you be willing to advise Client to take Position A if Client
refused to disclose?
YES - 34 (35%)
UNDECIDED - 19 (19.6%)
NO - 44 (45.4%)
2. Would you be willing to advise Client to take Position A if Client
was willing to disclose?
YES - 91 .(93.8%)
UNDECIDED - 5 (5.2%)
NO- 1 (1%)
For questions 3 and 4, assuming that Position A has only a reasonable
basis:
3. Would you be willing to advise Client to take Position A if Client
refused to disclose?
YES - 7 (7.2%)
UNDECIDED - 16 (16.5%)
NO - 74 (76.3 %)
1194
STANDARDS FOR TAX RETURN POSITIONS
4. Would you be willing to advise Client to take Position A if Client
was willing to disclose?
YES - 57 (58.8%)
UNDECIDED - 16 (16.5 %)
NO - 24 (24.7%)
5. Would you be willing to discuss the client's chances of being
audited with him?
YES - 76 (78.4%)
UNDECIDED - 7 (7.2%)
NO - 14 (14.4%)
6. ABA Opinion 85-352 requires a lawyer to withdraw representation
if Client takes a position which falls below RPOS even if the position has
a reasonable basis and is not frivolous. Do you agree or disagree with this
requirement?
AGREE - 13 (13.4%)
UNDECIDED - 15 (15.5%)
DISAGREE - 69 (71.1%)
7 Would you agree or disagree with the proposition that a single,
uniform reporting standard should be used for all reporting purposes?
AGREE - 58 (59.8%)
UNDECIDED - 24 (24.7%)
DISAGREE - 15 (15.5%)
8. Some have argued that the most appropriate single standard for tax
return positions should be a good faith belief that the tax return position
under consideration has a realistic possibility of being sustained adrmms-
tratively or judicially on its merits if challenged. Would you agree or
disagree?
AGREE - 70 (72.2%)
UNDECIDED - 16 (16.5%)
DISAGREE - 11 (11.3%)
9 Some also argue that secondary, sources such as treatises and
articles should be allowed to be used when a lawyer is assessing whether
a position has substantial authority Would you agree or disagree?
AGREE - 63 (65%)
UNDECIDED - 17 (17.5 %)
DISAGREE - 17 (17.5%)
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10. Adequate disclosure formerly cured a nonfrivolous substandard
position under the negligence, disregard of rules and regulations, substantial
understatement, and preparer penalties (although ABA Opinion 85-352 is
ambiguous on this point). The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993
changed the law so that a position must have at least a reasonable basis and
be disclosed m order for a taxpayer to be absolved of the substantial
understatement penalty, while it left the not frivolous standard for the
preparer penalty unchanged. Would you agree or disagree with this
change?
AGREE - 33 (34%)
UNDECIDED - 21 (21.7%)
DISAGREE - 43 (44.3%)
11. In your opinion, are the ABA and IRS rules governing lawyers in
advising tax return positions consistent, clearly defined, and reasonably
easy to apply9
AGREE - 1 (1 %)
UNDECIDED - 16 (16.5 %)
DISAGREE - 80 (82.5%)
Comments to Specific Questions:
1. Answered "yes" and added: "Prior to 1993, the disclosure of
positions not supported by substantial authority was rare. After the new
legislation, such disclosure will be even rarer."
2. Answered "yes" and added: "Clients want recommendations as to
what they should do. They aren't interested m the murky distinctions
between 'reasonable basis', 'reasonable possibility of success', 'non
frivolous', etc. that lawyers have contrived to show how bright they are,
'perfect' the system, and run up bills. If there is a reasonable, non-
laughable argument that can be made in support of a position, that position
will be (and should be) taken. I can't quantify when a position has a one
in three chance of success. No one can.
5. Answered "yes" and added: "and would discuss full potential
cost-penalty, interest and attorneys fees."
Answered "yes" and added: "but advise/urge against audit lottery
mentality "
6. Answered "disagree" and added: "This denies the client repre-
sentation which is central to our judicial system."
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Answered "disagree," circled the word "reasonable" in the question
and added: "if truly reasonable."
7 Answered "disagree" and added: "A single standard would be nice
dependent upon who sets the standard. Additionally, since laws tend to
evolve and interpretations change, a set standard may inhibit and delay
future changes."
Answered "disagree" and added: "The reason I disagree re
Question 7 is that the burden should not be as strenuously enforced re: a
fiduciary m an estate tax or fiduciary income tax situation as opposed to an
individual filing his or her own personal income tax."
8. Answered "agree" and added: "difficult or impossible to en-
force/admimster."
Answered "disagree" and added: "too low-wild, wild west
approach."
9 Answered "disagree" and added: "Including articles and treatises
presents too many variables if the goal is to narrow the range of acceptable
interpretations."
Answered "agree" and added: "but only to the extent that no other
authority exists compared to the situation where the secondary source
weighs competing authorities."
10. Answered "disagree" and added: "'reasonable' will be determined
by the trier of fact after the fact."
Answered "agree" and added: "Ambiguous question."
Answered "disagree" and added: "Unclear for many what the real
standard is."
11. Answered "disagree," circled the words "clearly defined" in the
question, and added: "academically maybe, but not applied in the heat of
practice with a fee paying client."
General Comments:
The survey is leading.
The biggest single problem in applying tests to a specific set of facts is the
large amount of research required to evaluate a position relative to the
standards in many cases where the client does not want to pay and/or will
not pay to have research done. If the matter is important enough, the
choice is either pay the freight or withdraw Reality is that the client will
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find a lawyer or CPA with less knowledge in the area (or more reckless
[sic]) and will file the way he wants. 9 times out of 10 nothing will happen
and the client believes he was right and you were wrong. In practice, very
few clients want the right answer, they want the answer they want to hear.
Some of us lawyers are also CPAs and we have yet a thurd set of rules to
consider with these issues!
Current IRS standards are confusing and difficult to comply with. It is not
fair that the IRS can impose penalties for positions taken which have been
upheld in court, but which the IRS disagrees with (for example, penalties
may be imposed for taking a position contrary to proposed regulations).
